Publications
Kuchtová, A. (2024). The Incalculability of the Generated Text. Philosophy & Technology, 37(1), 25. Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13347-024-00708-0
Abstract: In this paper, I explore Derrida's concept of exteriorization in relation to texts generated by machine learning. I first discuss Heidegger's view of machine creation and then present Derrida's criticism of Heidegger. I explain the concept of iterability, which is the central notion on which Derrida's criticism is based. The thesis defended in the paper is that Derrida's account of iterability provides a helpful framework for understanding the phenomenon of machine learning–generated literature. His account of textuality highlights the incalculability and mechanical elements characteristic of all texts, including machine-generated texts. By applying Derrida's concept to the phenomenon of machine creation, we can deconstruct the distinction between human and non-human creation. As I propose in the conclusion to this paper, this provides a basis on which to consider potential positive uses of machine learning.
Vacek, D. (2023). Two remarks on the new AI control problem. AI and Ethics, 1-6. Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s43681-023-00339-9
Abstract: This paper examines the new AI control problem and the control dilemma recently formulated by Sven Nyholm. It puts forth two remarks that may be of help in (dis)solving the problem and resolving the corresponding dilemma. First, the paper suggests that the idea of complete control should be replaced with the notion of considerable control. Second, the paper casts doubt on what seems to be assumed by the dilemma, namely that control over another human being is, by default, morally problematic. I suggest that there are some contexts (namely, relations of vicarious responsibility and vicarious agency) where having considerable control over another human being is morally unproblematic, if not desirable. If this is the case, control over advanced humanoid robots could well be another instance of morally unproblematic control. Alternatively, what makes it a problematic instance remains an open question insofar as the representation of control over another human being is not sufficient for wrongness, since even considerable control over another human being is often not wrong.
Kosterec, M. (2024). Moral Responsibility in a Vat. Acta Analytica, 1-8.
Abstract: This paper investigates an ingenious argument by Andrew Khoury which, if valid, could shed new light on some of the most relevant discussions within the field of moral philosophy. The argument is based on the idea that if we deny the phenomenon of resultant moral luck, then the proper objects of moral responsibility must be internal willings. I analyse the argument and find it unsound. The argument does not adequately account for the positions of all relevant moral actors when it comes to the moral evaluation of agents and their actions.
Zelinová, Z. (2024). Hésiodova Pandora ako prvá idea fembota?. Ostium, 20(1).
Abstract: Main purpose of the paper is to answer the question of whether Hesiod's Pandora in Theogony and Works and Days represents the first idea of an artificial woman, i.e., a kind of fembot or gynoid, in Western thought. The fulfilment of this aim is depending on answering several sub-questions: 1. to identify what fell within the ideological framework of intelligent technology in ancient Greek thought (especially in the poetic mythological tradition); 2. to answer the question of how Pandora and her artistic representations relate to the Greek custom of agalmatophilia; and 3. above all, to indicate what is the difference between the creation of Pandora and the creation of the first humans in ancient mythology. In our inquiry, we will build on the interpretations Adrienne Mayor offers in her famous book Gods and Robots: Myths, Machines and Ancient Dreams of Technology (2018), and we will critically contest them.
